Scope
The scope of the paper is to analyse incentive mechanisms for emission reduction in the live-streaming supply chain, focusing on the interaction between streamers and manufacturers. It develops a two-echelon game model to evaluate how different contract schemes impact emission reduction and profitability.
Summary
Peng et al. examine optimal coordination contracts to incentivise manufacturers to reduce emissions through live-streaming supply chains. The paper evaluates three schemes, decentralised, cost-sharing, and revenue-sharing contracts, employing a Stackelberg game model. Key findings reveal that both cost- and revenue-sharing contracts effectively enhance emission reduction and low-carbon publicity, with revenue-sharing yielding the highest outcomes. Consumer environmental awareness (CEA) has a significant impact on emission reduction. Additionally, the study highlights the positive influence of streamer reputation on the supply chain’s environmental and financial performance.
Relevance for EXIGENCE
Although the carbon footprint during product manufacturing is out of scope of EXIGENCE, the Stackelberg game model can be an approach to share the benefits of carbon footprint reduction among OTT video providers, cloud providers, and core/access network providers. An interesting question is if in this application the revenue-sharing model also outperforms the cost-sharing and decentralised models.
Peng, G. Lu, M. Liu, and Z. Zou, “Optimal coordination contracts for manufacturer and streamer joint emission reduction and low-carbon publicity in a live-streaming supply chain,” Environment Development and Sustainability, Jun. 2024.
